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Abstract. Many multi-agent systems (MASs) are situated in stochastic
environments. Some such systems that are based on the partially observ-
able Markov decision process (POMDP) do not take the benevolence of
other agents for granted. We propose a new POMDP-based framework
which is general enough for the specification of a variety of stochastic
MAS domains involving the impact of agents on each other’s reputa-
tions. A unique feature of this framework is that actions are specified as
either undirected (regular) or directed (towards a particular agent), and
a new directed transition function is provided for modeling the effects
of reputation in interactions. Assuming that an agent must maintain a
good enough reputation to survive in the network, a planning algorithm
is developed for an agent to select optimal actions in stochastic MASs.
Preliminary evaluation is provided via an example specification and by
determining the algorithm’s complexity.
Keywords: Learning · Trust and reputation · Planning · Uncertainty ·
POMDP.
1 Introduction
Autonomous (synthetic) agents need to deal with questions of trust and repu-
tation in diverse domains such as e-commerce platforms, crowdsourcing systems,
online virtual worlds, and P2P file sharing systems (Yu et al., 2013; Pinyol and Sabater-Mir,
2013), wireless sensor networks (Momani and Challa, 2010), the semantic web
(Artz and Gil, 2007) and distributed AI/multi-agent systems (Sabater and Sierra,
2005). Yet we see very few computational trust/reputation frameworks which
can handle uncertainty in actions and observations in a principled way and
which are general enough to be useful in several domains. A partially observ-
able Markov decision process (POMDP) (Monahan, 1982; Lovejoy, 1991) is an
abstract mathematical model for reasoning about the utility of sequences of ac-
tions in stochastic domains. Although its abstract nature allows it to be applied
to various domains where sequential decision-making is required, a POMDP is
typically used to model a single agent. We propose an extension to the POMDP,
which has the potential to be quite generally applicable in stochastic multi-agent
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systems where trust and reputation are an issue. We call the proposed model
Reputation Network POMDP (RepNet-POMDP or simply RepNet).
As is done by Pinyol et al. (2012), we distinguish between the image one
agent has in the eyes of another and the reputation with which an agent is asso-
ciated, given its aggregated image in the eyes of a group of agents. The unique
features of a RepNet are: (i) it distinguishes between undirected (regular) actions
and directed actions (towards a particular agent), (ii) besides the regular state
transition function, it has a directed transition function for modeling the effects
of reputation in interactions and (iii) its definition (and usability) is arguably
more intuitive than similar frameworks. Furthermore, we suggest methods for
updating agents’ image of each other, for learning action distributions of other
agents, and for determining perceived reputations from images. We present a
planning algorithm for an agent to select optimal actions in a network where
reputation makes a difference.
Many multi-agent systems need a rich framework to represent uncertainty,
especially when they are associated with the real world. What makes RepNets
different from most other frameworks for multi-agent reasoning about trust and
reputation is that uncertainty is treated as a primary concern. Many aspects of
the network are modeled as probability distributions, for instance, state tran-
sitions, possible observations, possible actions, and possible states. With this
richness in representation comes the usual higher complexity in reasoning.
We start by covering the relevant POMDP theory, for background. This
is followed by a section formally defining the proposed framework, including
a proposal for how reputation can be computed and learnt (updated) and an
algorithm for determining the actions which lead to optimal benefit. The optimal
impact algorithm is evaluated in terms of computational complexity. We take a
closer look at the RepNet model structure by working out the specification of
a simple domain. Finally, before our concluding remarks, we briefly review the
work most related to trust and reputation in groups of agents, especially where
there is much uncertainty.
2 Background - The POMDP
A POMDP is a tuple 〈S, A, T, Ω, O, R, b0〉, where S is a finite set of states, A is
a finite set of actions, T is a transition function s.t. T (s, a, s′) is the probability
that a executed in s will take an agent to s′, Ω is a finite set of observations,
O is an observation function s.t. O(a, o, s) is the probability that observation o
due to action a is perceived in s, R is a reward function s.t. R(s, a, s′) is the
(immediate) reward the agent experiences when it executes action a in state s
and ends up in state s′, and b0 ∈ ∆(S) is the initial probability distribution over
states when the agent is deployed.3
In POMDP theory, a probability distribution over states is called a belief
state. Formally, a belief state is a function b : S → [0, 1] such that
∑
s∈S b(s) = 1.
3 ∆(X) is the set of probability distributions over elements in X.
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The state estimation function is used by an agent to update its belief state. An
agent with current belief state bcur will have new belief state bnew = SE(a, o, bcur)
after performing action a and making observation o, where SE(a, o, bcur ) :=
{(s′, p) | s′ ∈ S} such that
p =
O(a, o, s′)
∑
s∈S T (s, a, s
′)bcur (s)
P (o | a, bcur)
is the probability of perceiving o in the belief state ‘reached’ after performing a
in b (P (o | a, b) :=
∑
s′∈S O(a, o, s
′)
∑
s∈S T (s, a, s
′)b(s) is a normalizing factor).
The expected reward – with respect to some belief state b – an agent gets for
executing action a is computed as
∑
s∈S R(a, s)b(s).
An agent should maximize the rewards it expects to receive in the future.
Rewards farther into the future are conventionally ‘discounted’ because, intu-
itively, situations in the distant future are less likely to be experienced. Hence, a
discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1] is applied when determining the value of sequences of
actions. The optimal value of belief state b given an horizon of k steps is defined
as the optimal belief state value function V ∗:
V ∗(b, k) := max
a∈A
{∑
s∈S
R(a, s)b(s) + γ
∑
o∈Ω
P (o | a, b)V ∗(SE(a, o, b), k − 1)
}
,
V ∗(b, 1) := max
a∈A
{∑
s∈S
R(a, s)b(s)
}
.
3 RepNet-POMDP - a Proposal
We shall first introduce the basic structure of a RepNet-POMDP, then discuss
matters relating to image and reputation, followed by our proposal of two instan-
tiation of the image update function, then explain how action distributions can
be learnt and finally, develop a definition (and thus an algorithm) for computing
optimal behaviour in RepNets.
3.1 The Basis
The components of the RepNet structure will first be introduced briefly, followed
by a detailed discussion of each component. A RepNet-POMDP is defined as a
pair of tuples 〈System,Agents〉. System specifies the aspects of the network that
apply to all agents; global knowledge shared by all agents.
System := 〈G,S,A,Ω, I, U〉,
where
– G is a finite set of agents {g, h, i, . . .}.
– S is a finite set of states.
– A is the union of finite disjoint sets of directed actions Ad and undirected
actions Au.
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– Ω is a finite set of observations.
– I : G× S ×G × S × A→ [−1, 1] is an impact function s.t. I(g, s, h, s′, a) is
the impact on g in s due to h in s′ performing action a.
– U : [0, 1] × [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] is an image update function used by
agents when updating their image profiles s.t. U(α, r, i) is the new image
level given learning rate α, current image level r and current impact i.
Agents specifies the names and subjective knowledge of the individual agents;
individual identifiers and beliefs per agent.
Agents := 〈{Tg}, {DTg}, {Og}, {AD
0
g}, {Img
0
g}, {B
0
g}〉,
4
where
– Tg : S ×A
u × S → [0, 1] is the transition function of agent g.
– DTg : S×A
d× [−1, 1]×S → [0, 1] is the directed transition function of agent
g s.t. DTg(s, a, r, s
′) is the probability that agent g executing an action a in
state s (directed towards some agent h) will take g to state s′, while g believes
that agent h perceives g’s reputation to be at level r. DTg(s, a, r, s
′) = P (s′ |
g, s, a, r), hence
∑
s′∈S DTg(s, a, r, s
′) = 1, given some current state s, some
reputation level r and some directed action a of g.
– Og is g’s observation function s.t. Og(a, o, s) is the probability that observa-
tion o due to action a is perceived by g in s.
– AD0g : G×S → ∆(A) is agent g’s initial action distribution providing g with
a probability distribution over actions for each agent in each state.
– Img0g : G × G → [−1, 1] is g’s initial image profile. Imgg(h, i) is agent h’s
image of agent i, according to g.
– B0g : G→ ∆(S) is g’s initial mapping from agents to belief states.
The agents in G are thought of as forming a linked group who can influence
each other positively or negatively and who cannot be influenced by agents
outside the network. It is assumed that all action execution is synchronous, that
is, one agent executes one action if and only if all agents execute one action.
All actions are assumed to have an equal duration and to finish before the next
actions are executed. The immediate effects of actions are also assumed to have
occurred before the next actions. That is, for every agent’s action, the successor
state is reached, reputation updated and impact completed before the next round
of actions is executed. We shall call these rounds of actions steps.
All agents share knowledge of who the agents in the network are, what the set
of possible states is (S), what actions can possibly be performed (A), impact of
actions (I), image update function (U), the set of possible observations (Ω) and
the likelihoods of perceiving them in various conditions. All other components
of the structure relate to individual agents and how they model some aspect
of the network: dynamics of their actions (Tg and DTg) and observations (Og),
4 Notation {Xg} is shorthand for {Xg | g ∈ G}. That is, there is a function X for each
agent in G.
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likelihood of actions of other agents (ADg), beliefs about reputation (Imgg) and
their initial belief states (Bg).
In this formalism, only the action distributions (ADg), image profiles (Imgg)
and set of belief states (Bg) change. All other models remain fixed.
An agent should maintain an image profile for all other agents in the network
in order to guide its own behaviour. An image profile is an assignment of image
levels between every ordered pair of agents. For instance, if (according to g) h’s
image of i (Imgg(i, h)) is, on average, low, g should avoid interactions with i if g
has a good image of h (Imgg(h, g)). Note that agents’ multi-lateral image is not
common knowledge in the network. Hence, each agent has only an opinion about
each pair of agent’s image as deemed by each other agent. In general, it is not
necessary that Imgg(g, h) = Imgh(g, h). Nor is it necessary that Imgg(h, i) =
Imgg(i, h).
Imgg(h, i) changes as agent g learns how agent i ‘treats’ its network neigh-
bour h. Agent g uses U to manage the update of its levels of reputation as
deemed by other agents. An agent needs to have a strategy how to build up
its image profile of each other agent. How should an agent adjust its opinion of
another agent if it keeps on being impressed by that agent? Formally, there is a
maximum image level of 1. Should a well-behaved agent get an image of 1 after
relatively few actions and then have its image stay at 1? Or should such a ‘good’
agent’s image gradually approach 1? If so, how gradually? We decided to define
the image update function U common to all agents for the sake of simplicity,
while introducing the RepNet-POMDP framework. This assumption can easily
be relaxed by defining U differently for each agent.
Actually, we define directed transitions to be conditioned on reputation (de-
rived from images): Suppose g wants to trade with h. Agent g could perform a
tradeWith h action. But if h deems g’s reputation to be low, h would not want
to trade with g. This is an example where the effect of an action by one agent
(g) depends on its level of reputation as perceived by the recipient of the action
(h). Note that it does not make sense to condition the transition probability on
the reputation level of the recipient as perceived by the actor (h’s reputation
as perceived by g in this example): The effect of an action by g should have
nothing to do with h’s image levels, given the action is already committed to by
g. However, the effect of an action committed to (especially one directed towards
a particular agent) may well depend on the actor’s (g’s) reputation levels; h may
react (effect of the action) differently depending on g’s reputation.
Continuing with the example, assume s′ is a state in which g gets what it
wanted out of a trade with h, and s is a state in which g is ready to trade. Then
DT (s, tradeWith h,−0.6, s′) might equal 0.1 due to h’s inferred unwillingness
to trade with g due to g’s current bad reputation (−0.6) as deemed by h. On the
other hand, DT (s, tradeWith h, 0.6, s′) might equal 0.9 due to g’s high esteem
(0.6) as deemed by g and thus inferred willingness to trade with g.
It makes sense to talk about the impact/effect of an action (a) from one state
(s) to another (s′): I(g, s, h, s′, a). Suppose you (agent g) are in state s where
you have a high energy level, and I (agent h) am in state s′ where I have a low
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energy level. If you push me (action a), you can push harder than usual and I
can recover or defend myself less than usual. The impact of the action is thus
dependent on both the state in which the action is executed and the state being
impinged upon.
It is assumed that every agent g has some (probabilistic) idea about what
actions its neighbours will perform in a given state. As stated in the definition
of the RepNet-POMDP structure, ADg(h, s) is a distribution over the actions
in A that h could take when in state s. It is debatable how realistic it would
be to have a single action model AD(h, s) common to all agents. Every agent
g perceives different signals, depending on their state. Every agent would thus
learn a different action distribution for its neighbours. One method for learning
these distributions is proposed later in this section.
The other component of the structure which changes is Bg; every agent (g)
maintains a probability distribution over states for every agent in G (including
itself). That is, for every agent g, its belief state for every agent h (Bg(h)) is
maintained and updated. In other words, every agent maintains a belief state
representing ‘where’ it thinks the other agents (incl. itself) are. As actions are
performed, every g updates these distributions of itself and its neighbours. In
POMDP theory, probability distributions over states are called belief states.
Bg changes via ‘normal’ state estimation as in regular POMDP theory. The
state estimation (update) theory for RepNet-POMDPs is explained in the next
subsection.
3.2 Image and Reputation in RepNets
There are many ways in which an agent can compute reputations, given the
components of a RepNet-POMDP. In this section, we investigate one approach.
The notions of trust and reputation are typically considered to be different
(Artz and Gil, 2007; Seymour and Peterson, 2009; Momani and Challa, 2010):
reputation informs trust with reputation itself being an agregation of indirect
information, namely, evalution of an agent which has propagated through a
network. However, it has also been argued that trust and reputation are not
easily distinguished (Pinyol et al., 2012, Sect. 7.1, e.g.). At a basic level, image
is an opinion of another agent which is built up from direct experience with that
agent (Conte and Paolucci, 2002; Pinyol et al., 2012). Direct experience or direct
interaction with an agent is sometimes viewed as a kind of reputation, however,
we feel it is useful to distinguish image as a personal experience, reputation
as propagated image valuations, and trust as reputation plus other sources of
information concerning an agent’s willingness to be vulnerable when dealing with
the trustee.
Recall that ADg(h, s) is the probability distribution over actions g believes h
executes in s. In other words, ADg(h, s)(a) is the probability of a being executed
by h in s according to g. The image that an agent i in state si has of an agent
h in state sh can be modeled as∑
a∈A
[
δADg(i, s
i)(a)I(h, sh, i, si, a) + (1 − δ)ADg(h, s
h)(a)I(i, si, h, sh, a)
]
,
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where δ ∈ [0, 1] trades off the importance of the impacts on h and impacts due
to h. As δ tends to 1, more importance is given to how i treats h and less to
how h treats i. Recall that Bg is the set of current belief states of all agents
in the network, according to g. Hence, Bg(i) is a belief state, and Bg(i)(s) is
the probability of i being in s, according to g. For better readability, we might
denote Bg(i) as b
g
i . Agent g perceives at some instant that i’s image of h is
Imageg(h, i, Bg) :=
∑
sh∈S
b
g
h(s
h)
∑
si∈S
b
g
i (s
i)
∑
a∈A
[
δADg(i, s
i)(a)I(h, sh, i, si, a)
+ (1− δ)ADg(h, s
h)(a)I(i, si, h, sh, a)
]
. (1)
In (1), the uncertainty of agents h and i’s states are taken into account. Note
that this perceived image is independent of g’s state.
Now we can define the new image of one agent h with respect to another i,
as perceived by a particular agent g:
U(α, Imgg(h, i), Imageg(h, i, Bg)),
where α is a learning rate supplied from outside. Just as SE updates an agent’s
belief state, the image expectation function IE(g, Imgg, α,Bg) := Img
′
g updates
an agent’s image profile. That is, given g’s set of belief states Bg, for all h, i ∈ G,
Img′g(h, i) = U(α, Imgg(h, i), Imageg(h, i, Bg)).
An agent g could form its opinion about h in at least three ways: (1) by
observing how other agents treat h, (2) by observing how h treats other agents
and (3) by noting other agents’ opinion of h. But g must also consider the reasons
for actions and opinions: Agent imight perform an action with a negative impact
on h because i believes h has a bad reputation or simply because i is bad. We
define reputation as
RepOf g(h) :=
1
|G|
[
Imgg(h, g) +
∑
i∈G,i6=g
Imgg(h, i)× Imgg(i, g)
]
.
Here, we have assumed that it does not make sense to weight Imgg(h, g) by
Imgg(g, g) because it makes no sense to weight one’s opinion about h’s image
by one’s opinion of one’s own image. Hence, Imgg(h, g) is implicitly weighted by
1.
To get a better feel for the behaviour of RepOf g(h), consider the following
table. The third column can be thought of as the real reputation of h according
to what g believes i thinks of h. Notice that if i has a negative image level, then
g regards h in an opposite way to how i regards h. That is, an agent with a
negative image is regarded as purposefully misleading. Moreover, the degree of
negativity of i’s image gives the degree to which g regards h in the opposite light.
If h has zero image according to i, then g cannot assign a reputation to h, no
matter what g thinks of i. Similarly, if i has zero image, then g cannot assign any
reputation to h, no matter what i thinks of h. When i has an image close to zero
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Imgg(h, i) Imgg(i, g) Imgg(h, i) × Imgg(i, g)
-0.5 -0.5 0.25
0.0 -0.5 0.0
0.5 -0.5 -0.25
-0.5 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 0.0 0.0
-0.5 0.5 -0.25
0.0 0.5 0.0
0.5 0.5 0.25
(according to g), it is like assigning very little informational value to what i says.
And if i has high image (close to 1), then i’s opinions are highly trusted, but if
i has low image (close to -1), then i’s opinions are highly distrusted, informing
g to believe the complete opposite of what i proclaims.
The question is, Where did g get i’s image? What if, for instance, g hears
from trusted agent j that i’s reputation/image is opposite to what g thought
of i’s reputation? There are several ways to remedy this uncertainty. One way
is to iteratively seek and weight the reputation of agents to some ‘depth’. This
method has technical difficulties which we do not try to address now. The simple
approach above partly solves the problem in two ways. (1) i’s reputation is only
one of all the reputations considered by g, and g takes the average of all agents’
opinions of g to come to a conclusion of what to think of h (h’s reputation
according to g). (2) Reputation is also informed by actual activity, as perceived
by each agent g. Hence, every agent builds up more accurate opinions of other
agents, according to their activities (not only what others say about others).
Activities inform image and image informs reputation.
Suppose a step has just occurred and g perceives o. Let bgh be the belief state
g assigns to h. The new belief state of some agent g according to itself is defined
by
OSE(a, o, (bgg)cur ) := {(s
′, p) | s′ ∈ S} (2)
such that
p =
O(a, o, s′)
∑
s∈S T
du
g (s, a, s
′, g)(bgh)cur (s)
P (o | a, (bgg)cur )
and, recalling that Ad and Au are the sets of directed, respectively, undirected
actions,
T dug (s, a, s
′, h) :=
{
DT (s, a,RepOf g(h), s
′) if a ∈ Ad
T (s, a, s′) if a ∈ Au
and P (o | a, b) is a normalizing constant. We call definition (2) the objective
state estimation function (of agent g).
The new belief state of h (6= g) according to g is defined by
SSE(g, h, o, (bgh)cur ) := {(s
′, p) | s′ ∈ S} (3)
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such that
p =
∑
a∈AO(a, o, s
′)
∑
s∈S T
du
g (s, a, s
′, h)(bgh)cur (s)ADg(h, s)(a)
P (o | ADg, (b
g
h)cur )
and P (o | ADg, b) is a normalizing constant. We call definition (3) the subjective
state estimation function (of agent h other than g).
An agent g uses (3) when updating its belief about other agents’ belief states,
else g uses (2) to update its own belief state. Let BSE(g, a, o, Bg) be the set of
belief states of all agents (from g’s perspective) after the next step, determined
from the current set of belief states Bg, given agent g executed a and perceived
o. That is, BSE(g, a, o, Bg) is defined as
{(h, bgh) | h ∈ G, h 6= g, b
g
h = SSE(g, h, o, Bg(h))} ∪ {(g,OSE(a, o, Bg(g)))}.
3.3 Possible Instantiations of U
One instantiation implements the idea that if the impact is positive, a fraction
of the reputation required to reach full reputation (1) is added to the current
reputation level, and if the impact is negative, a fraction of the reputation re-
quired to reach full distrust (-1) is subtracted from the current reputation level.
The fraction added or subtracted is proportional to the learning rate α and the
magnitude of the impact (|i|):
U(α, r, i) :=
{
r + α(1− r)i if i ≥ 0
r + α(r + 1)i if i < 0
We shall refer to this instantiation of U as difference update. Suppose agent g
has no opinion about the agent causing the impact (i.e., r = 0). And suppose α
is 0.5. Then
– if i = 1, U(0.5, 0, 1) = 0.5
– if i = 0.5, U(0.5, 0, 0.5) = 0.25
– if i = −0.5, U(0.5, 0,−0.5) = −0.25
– if i = −1, U(0.5, 0,−1) = −0.5.
Another instantiation implements the idea that if the impact is positive,
reputation increases until full reputation (1) is reached, and if the impact is
negative, reputation is decreased until full distrust (-1) is reached:
U(α, r, i) :=


1 if r + αi > 1
−1 if r + αi < −1
r + αi otherwise.
We shall refer to this instantiation of U as saturation update.
Suppose α is 0.5. Suppose i = 1 for fifty steps (due to a particular agent h’s
actions). After these fifty steps, g’s reputation in h will be 1. Then suppose that
for steps 51 and 52, i = −1. Then g’s reputation in h will be 0 (neutral). However,
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if i were 1 for only four steps (instead of fifty), and then −1 for two steps, then g’s
reputation in h would still be 0. This might seem counter-intuitive: In the former
case, h seems to have earned more reputation than in the latter case, although
g ends up having a neutral opinion about h in both cases. On the other hand,
one could argue that once a person (agent) is fully trusted, their future positive
actions do not add much to one’s opinion of the person. However, as soon as
that person does one or two things deemed negative, one’s reputation in that
person rapidly decreases. High (and low) reputation levels reached via difference
update need to be ‘earned’, and these levels are less sensitive to occasional ‘out-
of-character’ actions than levels maintained via saturation update.
There are of course many more possible instantiations of U . Just as the re-
ward function in POMDPs needs to be tailored for the domain, U needs to be
tailored for the RepNet-POMDP domain. Choosing between difference, satura-
tion or some other update function will be domain dependent.
3.4 Learning Action Distributions
In this section, we present one way in which an agent can incrementally learn
what actions other agents are likely to perform. That is, we propose how some
agent g can learn the probability of some agent h performing some action in
some state. The agent learns by Bayesian conditionalization on observations.
We use the update (learning) rule
∀a ∈ A,ADg(h, s)(a)← Pg(a | o, h, s),
where, according Bayes Rule,
Pg(a | o, h, s) =
Pg(o | a, h, s)Pg(a | h, s)
Pg(o | h, s)
=
Pg(o | a, h, s)Pg(a | h, s)∑
a′∈A Pg(o | a
′, h, s)Pg(a′ | h, s)
.
We would like to replace Pg(o | a, h, s) with O(a, o, s), but we may not do a
direct replacement: a is assumed performed in s, but o is perceived in the state
reached via a from s. Therefore, Pg(o | a, h, s) is approximated by
∑
s′∈S
T du(s, a, s′)O(a, o, s′).
Pg(a | h, s) is replaced with ADg(h, s)(a). Hence, we define the action distribu-
tion expectation function as ADE(g, o, ADg) := AD
′
g such that, for all h ∈ G,
s ∈ S and a ∈ A,
AD′g(h, s)(a) =∑
s′∈S T
du(s, a, s′)O(a, o, s′)ADg(h, s)(a)∑
a′∈A
∑
s′∈S T
du(s, a′, s′)O(a′, o, s′)ADg(h, s)(a′)
.
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3.5 Optimal Behaviour in RepNets
Advancement of an agent in RepNet-POMDPs is measured by the total impact
on the agent. An agent might want to maximize the network’s (positive) impact
on it after several steps in the system.
An agent g currently in sg can predict agent h’s action a performed in sh to
cause an instantaneous impact on it (g). The expected instantaneous impact of
h in sh on g in sg is calculated as∑
a∈A
ADg(h, s
h)(a)I(g, sg, h, sh, a).
We abbreviate the un-normalized perceived impact on g in sg by the network
neighbours ∑
h∈G,h 6=g
∑
sh∈S
Bg(h)(s
h)
∑
a∈A
I(g, sg, h, sh, a)ADg(h, s
h)(a)
as PIN(g, sg, ADg, Bg). That is, PIN(g, s
g, Bg) is the expected impact other
agents have on g in a particular state, with respect to the neighbours’ possible
actions and their belief states.
The self impact on g executing a in sg is defined as I(g, sg, g, sg, a). Here we
take it that every agent knows which action it performs. We thus define the total
perceived impact on g by the network as
PItot (g, a, Bg) :=
1
|G|
∑
sg∈S
Bg(g)(s
g)
(
PIN(g, sg, ADg, Bg) + I(g, s
g, g, sg, a)
)
.
Intuitively, an agent g can choose its next action so as to maximize the total
impact all agents will have on it in the future. Then the optimal impact function
w.r.t. g over the next k steps is defined as
OI(g,ADg, Imgg, Bg, k) :=max
a∈A
{
PItot (g, a, Bg)
+ γ
∑
o∈Ω
P (o | a,Bg)OI(g,AD
′
g, Img
′
g, B
′
g, k − 1)
}
,
OI(g,ADg, Imgg, Bg, 1) :=max
a∈A
{
PItot (g, a, Bg)
}
,
whereAD′g isADE(g, o, ADg), Img
′
g is IE(g, Imgg, α,Bg) andB
′
g isBSE(g, a, o, Bg).
3.6 Complexity of Computing Optimal Behaviour
Every agent in a network is assumed to have its own computing resources. For
an individual agent, the number of computations involved in determining
OI(g,ADg, Imgg, Bg, k) is approximately
(PItot + PSSE +ADE + IE +BSE)
k−1∑
ℓ=1
(|A||Ω|)ℓ, (4)
where
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– PItot denotes O(|G||S|
2|A|),
– PSSE denotes the complexity of P (o | a,Bg) which is O(|A||S|
2),
– ADE denotes O(|G||S|2|A|2),
– IE denotes O(|G|2|S|2|A|),
– BSE denotes O(2|G||S|2).
By the identity of geometric series, (4) equals
(PItot + PSSE +ADE + IE +BSE)
|A||Ω|(1 − (|A||Ω|)k−1)
1− |A||Ω|
= O((|G||S|2|A|+ |A||S|2 + |G||S|2|A|2 + |G|2|S|2|A|+ 2|G||S|2)|A|k|Ω|k)
= O((|G||S|2|A|2 + |G|2|S|2|A|)|A|k|Ω|k)
= O(|G||S|2|A|(|A| + |G|)|A|k|Ω|k)
= O(|A|k+1|Ω|k|S|2|G|(|A|+ |G|)).
Compared to the O(|A|k|Ω|k|S|2) for V ∗ for regular finite horizon planning,
we see that computing the optimal impact (for an individual agent) in a RepNet-
POMDP is in the order of |A|(|A|+ |G|) times more complex. If, however, com-
putation is centralized on one CPU, and assuming that every agent requires
planning (i.e., every agent is an AI), then the complexity of finite horizon plan-
ning in a RepNet-POMDP is O(|A|k+1|Ω|k|S|2|G|2(|A|+ |G|)).
4 Related Work
We separate this section into three groups: Section 4.1: frameworks that include
notions of quantitative uncertainty, but that do not involve the POMDP model,
Section 4.2: frameworks that employ POMDPs as a component, but cannot be
specified as a POMDP or variant thereof alone, and Section 4.3: frameworks
that are variants of the POMDP (and thus most related to the present work).
In each subsection, we provide a short review of related work and then compare
it to the RepNet framework.
4.1 Non-POMDP frameworks that include notions of quantitative
uncertainty
We briefly review two papers under this category.
Yu and Singh (2002) develop an (uncertain) evidential model of reputation
management based on the Dempster-Shafer theory. If an agent g has had suf-
ficient interactions with agent h, g bases its opinions on the quality of services
received during those interactions. If g has had insufficient interactions with h,
it will seek referrals from (trusted) neighbours, who may be witnesses of interac-
tion with h. If the neighbours are not witnesses, they will request witnesses from
their neighbours, and so on. A limitation of this approach is that it models only
the uncertainty in the services received and in the trustworthiness of neighbours
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who provide referrals. It does not model dynamical systems, nor does it allow
for stochastic actions and observations.
Pinyol et al. (2012) propose an integration of a cognitive reputation model,
called Repage, into a BDI agent. They define a many-sorted, first-order, prob-
abilistic logic capable of capturing the semantics of Repage information. The
logic includes predicates for belief, image and reputation. The logic is used to
build a multi-context BDI system where beliefs, desires, intentions and plans
interact among each other to perform reasoning. The authors base their archi-
tecture on the social evaluation theory of (Conte and Paolucci, 2002) which de-
scribes a typology of possible decisions that autonomous agents can make: Epis-
temic decisions cover the dynamics of beliefs regarding image and reputation,
that is, decisions about updating and generating evaluations by social groups.
Pragmaticstrategic decisions are are concerned with how to behave with poten-
tial partners using social group evaluation information, and thus, how agents
use these decisions to reason. Memetic decisions refer to the decisions of how
and when to spread social evaluations. Pinyol et al. (2012) focus on pragmatic-
strategic decisions. Their logic uses the notion of roles for specifying capabilities
or services, for instance, quality of product and delivery time. The probabilities
of action outcomes and the probabilities of agent roles can be specified. Prob-
abilistic distributions over image and reputation (for the same agent and role)
are combined to generate beliefs that an agent acts on.
With their logic, Pinyol et al. (2012) can specify capabilities or services that
our framework cannot. On the other hand, their Repage + BDI architecture
cannot model noisy observations or uncertainty in state (belief states). Whereas
the approach of Yu and Singh (2002) keeps a history of a fixed number of in-
teractions to determine “local belief” and fixed depth “referral chains”, our
framework is more flexible. Admittedly, our framework may require a learning
rate for maintaining ‘local belief’ (which we call image).
4.2 Frameworks that employ POMDPs as a component
We briefly review two frameworks with a POMDP as component.
Regan et al. (2005) aim to construct a principled framework, called Advisor-
POMDP, for buyers to choose the best seller based on some measure of repu-
tation in a market consisting of autonomous agents: “A selection of approaches
to representing reputation using Dempster-Shafter Theory and Bayesian proba-
bility are surveyed and a model for collecting and using reputation is developed
using a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process” (Regan et al., 2005). It
is noted that Advisor-POMDP models a single buyer agent, maintaining a vector
of reputations of sellers. The buyer may ask for advice from advisors about a
seller, who respond with (i.e., the buyer perceives) 〈repi, cfi〉 where repi is the
reputation and the certainty factor cfi is a measure of the epistemic uncertainty
of seller i. RepNets do not do not utilize such confidence levels.
SALE POMDP (Irissappane et al., 2014) is an extension of Advisor-POMDP:
It can deal with the seller selection problem by reasoning about advisor quality
and/or trustworthiness and selectively querying for information to finally selects
14 Gavin Rens, Abhaya Nayak, and Thomas Meyer
a seller with high quality. Moreover, SALE POMDP has a factored formulation
which “allows it to scale to reasonably large seller selection problems without
loss in quality” of agent behaviour (Irissappane et al., 2014).
The major difference between Advisor- and SALE POMDP on the one hand,
and RepNets on the other, is that a RepNet has a model for every agent in the
network and every agent has a (subjective) view on every other agent’s belief
state and action likelihood. Advisor- and SALE POMDP do not allow for the
modeling of common information shared by all agents in the network, and hence
cannot cater for agents having views of other agents’ belief state and action
likelihood.
4.3 Frameworks that are based on POMDPs
Whereas Decentralized POMDPs (DEC-POMDPs) (Bernstein et al., 2000) are
concerned more with effective collaboration in noisy environment than with self-
advancement in a network of potentially unfriendly strangers. Although each
agent has its own actions and observations in a DEC-POMDP, the effects of their
combined actions and observations are modeled. Amato et al. (2013) discuss four
notable sublasses of the DEC-POMDP.
Interactive POMDPs (I-POMDPs) (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005) are for
specifying and reasoning about multiple agents, where willingness to cooperate
is not assumed. Whereas DEC-POMDP agents do not have a model for every
other agent’s belief state and action likelihood, I-POMDP agents maintain a
model of every other agent (incl. their own). A model that agent g has of agent
h is not necessarily the model h has of itself. In other words, agents have beliefs
about what other agents believe. The models of other agents also contain models
of other agents, recursively. The recursion could theoretically be infinite, but for
practical purposes, models are finitely nested. An agent’s state is composed of
two parts: a part representing the physical environment and a part represent-
ing the (nested) models of other agents. Every agent has its own actions and
observations, and as in DEC-POMDPs, every agent has its own transition func-
tion for combined actions, and an observation function for combined actions and
own observations. Only the physical part of states are involved in transition and
observation functions. An agent’s reward function models its preferences over
physical states and models of other agents. In contract to RepNet agents which
keep only the belief state of other agents and action likelihood (not the full model;
not recursive), I-POMDPs have an arbitrary model nesting depth. The benefit
of deeper nesting is the deeper insights and thus better informed decisions that
can be made. However the drawback of deeper nesting is computational com-
plexity (see Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi (2009) for Monte-Carlo sampling methods
for approximate solutions to I-POMDPs). The fact that a RepNet keeps track
of other agents’ beliefs outside of the set of states S is a form of factorization,
which reduces the curse of dimensionality. That is, because other agents’ beliefs
are factored out of the set of possible states S, the cardinality of S is orders of
magnitude less.
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I-POMDPs and DEC-POMDPs do not have a notion for trust, reputation or
image. Seymour and Peterson Seymour and Peterson (2009) introduce notions
of trust to the I-POMDP, which they call trust-based I-POMDP (TI-POMDP).
A trust model τi (similar to our Imgg) is maintained as part of agent states.
They define transition functions from environment states to environment states
(via composite actions), which reportedly includes changes to τi. However, there
are several inconsistencies in the presentation of their framework; it is thus hard
to compare RepNets to TI-POMDPs. Nonetheless, RepNets are arguably more
understandable model structures than I-POMDP and TI-POMDPs, and as with
I-POMDPs, the factored formulation of RepNets reduces the curse of dimension-
ality.
5 Summary and Future Work
This paper presented a new framework, called RepNet-POMDP, for agents in a
network of self-interested agents to make considered decisions. The framework
deals with several kinds of uncertainty and facilitates agents in determining the
reputation of other agents. An algorithm was provided for an agent to look ahead
several steps in order to choose actions in a way that will influence its reputation
so as to maximize the network’s positive impact on the agent. We aimed to
make the framework easily understandable and generally applicable in systems
of multiple, self-interested agents where partial observability and stochasticity
of actions are problems. To illustrate the usefulness of RepNet-POMDPs, the
full version of this paper has an example where we set up a trading domain for
a network of four agents.
There are of course many more possible instantiations of U . Just as the re-
ward function in POMDPs needs to be tailored for the domain, U needs to be
tailored for the RepNet-POMDP domain. Choosing between difference, satura-
tion or some other update function will be domain dependent. The full version
of this paper provides a detailed discussion.
In the full version of this paper, we present one way in which an agent
can incrementally learn what actions other agents are likely to perform. That
is, we propose how some agent g can learn the probability of some agent h
performing some action in some state. The agent learns by Bayesian conditioning
on observations.
There are many ways to define image and reputation. The framework could
also have been made more sophisticated, requiring a trust layer. These consider-
ations are left for future work. We did not discuss how one could, in the RepNet
framework, distinguish between a new agent whose image or reputation is un-
known and a well-known agent with an average image (RepOf g(h) ≈ 0). This is
not a failing of the RepNet framework, but discuss it is beyond the scope of this
paper. We have assumed that RepOf g is the weighted average of all image opin-
ions, but it might be more reasonable for g to take others’ opinions less seriously
as it builds confidence about images of agents over time via actual activities per-
ceived. Another aspect of RepNet that needs improvement is reputation (trust)
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in context. The present framework assumes a global context, wherein the learnt
reputation of an agent is applicable at all times / in all states. This approach is
appropriate only in very narrow or specific domains where there are few degrees
of freedom in context. Typically though, context will change, and applicability
of reputation of agents will change with context. See, for instance, the work of
Nayak (2012) and Pinyol et al. (2012).
Asking for trust/reputation opinions from trusted agents is not possible in
RepNet-POMDPs. All reputation info comes through observation; none through
direct communication. If the image profiles were part of the states (as in I-
POMDPs (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005)), ‘asking’ might be modeled. But
this would play into the curse of dimensionality; a bad thing.
Clearly, the planning algorithm presented here is highly intractable. Approx-
imate methods for solving large POMDPs could also be looked at to make Rep-
Nets practical (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2009; Irissappane et al., 2014).
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